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WHAT IS TOUCH? 
Matthew Ratcliffe 
 
This paper addresses the nature of touch or ‘tactual perception’. I argue that touch encompasses a 
wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, 
and that the permissive conception we are left with is so permissive that it is unclear how touch might 
be distinguished from the other senses. I conclude that no criteria will succeed in individuating touch. 
Although I do not rule out the possibility that this also applies to other senses, I suggest that the 
heterogeneity of touch makes it both distinctive and particularly problematic. 
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1. Introduction 
What characteristics unite all forms of touch and, at the same time, distinguish them from 
perception by means of another sense? In this paper, I will argue that there are none. My 
discussion will focus upon the influential list of criteria for individuating the senses proposed 
by Grice [1966: 135]: 
 
1. What we are aware of via the sense. For example, colour is specific to vision and loudness to 
hearing. 
2. The quality of the sensory experience, what Grice calls its ‘special introspectible character’. 
3. The sensory stimulus (e.g. physical contact for touch, sound waves for hearing, and light rays 
for vision). 
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4. The structure of the sense organs and their connections to the brain.1 
 
The reason for this focus is that most subsequent accounts appeal to and further develop one 
or more of these same criteria.
2
 Many continue to maintain that the phenomenology of sense 
perception plays a role. Some phenomenological approaches appeal to the distinctive 
experiential quality associated with each sense, whereas others emphasise what is perceived 
with that sense. It is debatable whether these criteria are compatible, and much of Grice’s 
discussion is concerned with defending the distinction between (1) and (2) against the 
objection that there is no more to perceptual experience than what is perceived.
3
 Throughout 
this paper, I treat both criteria as phenomenological. Grice does not claim that (1) in the 
absence of (2) would amount to a complete absence of experience, but that there would be no 
more to the experience than what is experienced, no additional ‘quality’.  
There are also non-phenomenological approaches, which develop Grice’s fourth 
criterion, sometimes in conjunction with the third.
4
 Perhaps the most sophisticated of these is 
that of Keeley [2002], who does not deny the reality of sensory experience but claims that it 
is not what individuates a sense. He proposes four criteria that are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for doing so:  
 
1. Physics: Each sense is receptive to a different kind of energy. 
                                                          
1
 Grice offers these criteria in response to the more specific question of how to distinguish a newly discovered 
sense from a new form of an existing sense. 
2
 Although most recent approaches develop only some of Grice’s criteria, Grice himself maintains that they are 
all compatible. 
3
 See Coady [1974] for an early critique of Grice’s distinction between (1) and (2). See Lopes [2000] for a 
defence of it. I will later side with Grice. 
4
 See Roxbee Cox [1970] and Nudds [2003] for overviews and critical discussions of all three types of approach. 
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2. Neurobiology: Different senses have different sense organs and connections to the brain. 
3. Behaviour: The organism is able to discriminate stimuli on the basis of the relevant form of 
energy, without recourse to other ways of detecting differences. 
4. Dedication: A sense is not only receptive to a stimulus but also dedicated to detection of that 
stimulus (where dedication is understood in evolutionary and developmental terms). 
 
Keeley’s criteria (3) and (4) are not mentioned by Grice. However, they are compatible with 
Grice’s two non-phenomenological criteria and can be construed as refinements of them that 
serve to rule out certain counter-examples, rather than as a substantial departure from Grice’s 
original list. 
None of these approaches apply unproblematically to every candidate sense. Things 
get especially murky when we consider the senses of other species. There is an obvious 
problem here for phenomenological criteria: it is not clear how to reach reliable conclusions 
about the presence and character of sensory experience in non-human animals. Non-
phenomenological criteria face problems too, at least in more exotic cases. For instance, Gray 
[2005] argues that, contrary to Keeley’s account, pit vipers possess two kinds of sense organ 
dedicated to detecting the same class of energy, whereas vampire bats may have an organ 
dedicated to detecting two classes of energy.  
However, I want to suggest that there is an equally if not more difficult problem 
closer to home, concerning touch. To simplify the problem, I restrict myself to the question of 
what distinguishes touch in humans from the other human senses, and do not discuss touch in 
other species. Distinguishing the human senses from each other might seem comparatively 
easy. For example, regardless of what applies to pit vipers, sight seems to be the only human 
sense that utilises light as a proximal stimulus. And different human senses surely involve 
distinctive kinds of experience. But the problem with touch (or ‘tactual perception’ – I treat 
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the two terms as synonymous) is its diversity. Touch, I will show, encompasses a range of 
very different experiences and has many different functions. Furthermore, there is no clearly 
bounded organ of touch and it is responsive to several different kinds of energy or sensory 
stimulus.
5
 I will argue against dividing touch up into a number of distinct senses, but will 
conclude that this leaves us with something so heterogeneous that no criteria can unite its 
various characteristics and at the same time exclude characteristics of other senses. Of course, 
not all attempts to distinguish the senses are shaped by the same assumptions, concerns and 
goals. Keeley [2002] seeks a naturalistic account that is applicable in the context of scientific 
research, whereas others, such as Grice, also aim to capture something of our everyday 
distinctions.
6
 However, my argument will apply to both kinds of project. 
 
2. Touch and Physical Contact 
There has been surprisingly little work on touch in the philosophy of mind, although notable 
recent contributions have been made by Martin [1992; 1993; 1995] and O’Shaughnessy 
[1989; 1995]. Neither author is principally concerned with what distinguishes touch from the 
other senses. Nevertheless, their work is suggestive of two criteria. O’Shaughnessy 
emphasises that touch is a contact sense: 
 
…..in touch a body investigates bodies as one body amongst others, for in touch we directly 
appeal to the tactile properties of our own bodies in investigating the self-same tactile 
properties of other bodies. […..] ….the space and solidity of our own bodies provides the 
access to the space and solidity of other bodies [1989: 38].  
 
                                                          
5
 Others who have remarked upon the heterogeneity of touch include Roxbee Cox [1970] and Nelkin [1990].  
6
 See Nudds [2003] for a discussion of how analyses are shaped by different explanatory projects. 
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It is not always clear whether he is claiming that touch is distinctive insofar as it operates via 
physical contact or that it involves experience of physical contact. In fact, he endorses both: 
touch involves physical contact with an object of perception and also an experience of contact 
with it. Martin [1992; 1995] makes the more specific phenomenological claim that touch 
incorporates perception of the boundaries between our bodies and what they come into 
contact with. Hence we have two criteria that might individually or jointly succeed in 
individuating touch: 
 
i. Touch involves physical contact between a perceiver’s body and an object of perception 
ii. The content of tactual experience includes a sense of physical contact with something or 
perhaps, more specifically, of the boundary between one’s body and another entity. 
 
Let us start with (i). Although physical contact is not sufficient for tactual perception, 
it might suffice to distinguish touch from other senses. Not all tactual perception involves 
contact with solid objects. But it could still be that there is always contact between perceiver 
and the perceived. For example, we perceive the heat of the air that comes into contact with 
our bodies and the force of the wind upon us. Hence we have a version of Grice’s stimulus 
criterion (3), where the stimulus is physical contact with the perceived. In contrast, what we 
perceive through hearing, vision and smell is usually distinct from what stimulates the 
relevant sensory receptors. This does not rule out taste, which is also a contact sense, but the 
account could be refined by appealing more specifically to pressure. This would avoid the 
‘taste’ objection, if it could be shown that taste does not rely upon pressure in the same way 
as touch. (I will refer to physical contact rather than pressure here, but my argument will also 
apply more specifically to pressure.)  
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However, it is not entirely clear how to understand the claim that tactual perception 
relies upon physical contact in a distinctive way. Touch depends upon a range of different 
kinds of sensory receptor in the skin, some deeper than others, and their receptive fields differ 
in size. These cutaneous receptors do not make direct contact with a perceived object. The 
surface of the skin might do so, but the receptors operate through a medium, just like other 
kinds of sensory receptor. When perceiving the touch of an object through one’s fingernail or 
through the hard, thick skin of one’s heel, its presence is more apparent. Granted, touch 
receptors are usually closer to the perceived object than in hearing, vision and smell, but 
proximity is not contact. We could still maintain that the organism comes into contact with 
what it perceives, but it is debatable where the exterior boundary of the perceiving organism 
lies. Keeley [2002: 12] suggests that, where the senses are concerned, the relevant boundary 
is between the nervous system and everything outside of it. In support of this, we can 
perceive the touch of a splinter beneath the skin’s surface. However, it could instead be 
argued that the organismic boundary extends beyond the skin. Many of the nerve endings 
involved in touch are clustered around hair follicles, and it is often the hair that is acted upon 
by some force, rather than the skin. Humans do not have much hair, and the point could be 
made more effectively by appealing to furry mammals, many of which also use whiskers or 
‘vibrissae’ to sense the proximity of objects and the width of apertures. 
We could perhaps settle for a hazy boundary, but there is another line of criticism, 
which starts with the observation that stimulation by an entity does not amount to perception 
of that entity. Sight is receptive to light, and hearing to vibration in the inner ear, but what we 
perceive through these senses is not normally light hitting the retina or vibration in the ear; 
the proximal stimuli are means by which we perceive other things. Hence, although here is a 
habitual association between (a) perception by means of a sense that we call ‘touch’ and (b) 
‘touch’ as two entities coming into physical contact with each other, it should not simply be 
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assumed that the content of (a) always includes (b). It follows that criterion (i), even though it 
is not explicitly phenomenological, can be challenged phenomenologically. If what we 
experience through touch does not always include something in physical contact with our 
bodies, then (i) fails to isolate a universal feature of tactual perception. The argument does 
not have to proceed phenomenologically though. We could instead ask which properties are 
‘detected’ by a given sense [e.g. Gibson 1968]. Although an organism might detect more 
properties through touch than it experiences, it seems safe to assume that what is experienced 
is also detected. Hence a phenomenological case, if successful, can also be couched in non-
phenomenological terms. (It is possible to weaken the contact claim, so as to insulate it from 
such criticism, by maintaining only that ‘touch utilises physical contact or pressure in a 
distinctive way’, regardless of what is perceived. I will address this weaker version in Section 
6.) 
  Criterion (ii) is also vulnerable to phenomenological criticism. Martin [1995: 272] 
maintains that tactual sensation ‘has the character of being within one’s boundaries, and 
hence the feeling of being internal’, adding that a feeling of internality implies perception of 
externality too. But that a sensation is generated by stimulation at bodily location x does not 
entail that it is felt to be at x. And, even if it is felt to be at x, it need not incorporate a 
distinction between x and other parts of one’s body, or between x and things outside of one’s 
body. You don’t get perception of location and boundary solely in virtue of something 
occurring at a location near a boundary. Martin [1993: 211] acknowledges this but insists, on 
phenomenological grounds, that human tactual perception does invariably involve experience 
of the boundary between our bodies and what we make contact with. However, it is arguable 
that not all tactual experiences do. There are many cases where it at least seems that, through 
contact with an entity, we perceive something in addition to or perhaps even instead of that 
entity. A commonplace example of distance touch is a blind person using a cane to actively 
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explore the environment. Passive touch can also operate through an external medium. If I feel 
a hand on my back, I do not perceive my shirt; I perceive the hand through the medium of 
shirt and skin. Similarly, I do not perceive the sole of my shoe but the rough ground beneath 
it. But it could be argued that, in cases like these, we indirectly perceive or infer the 
properties of an entity by perceiving another entity. Surely we still ‘touch’ the cane and the 
shoe; we are not completely insensitive to them. However, I will argue in Section 3 that this 
response cannot accommodate all cases - touch does not require physical contact with an 
object of perception or, for that matter, experience of contact or boundaries. Hence criteria 
along the lines of (i) and (ii) should be rejected. In the process, I will also work towards a 
stronger claim: the contents of tactual perception are so diverse that no phenomenological 
characteristics unite them all and also distinguish them from other forms of perception. At the 
same time, I will resist the view that what we call ‘touch’ is actually a number of different 
senses.  
 
3. The Contents of Tactual Perception 
Consider the remarks ‘I feel hot’, ‘it feels hot’, ‘the room feels hot’, ‘I can feel the hot sun on 
my back’, ‘the cup feels hot’ and ‘the fire feels hot’. These could be associated with very 
different experiences of heat. The object of perception in each case is not simply ‘heat’ at a 
particular bodily location. I might feel hot without feeling that my surroundings are hot. 
Alternatively, I might feel that a room is hot without feeling hot myself, And ‘it feels hot’ can 
refer to a feeling of heat that does not neatly distinguish one’s body from its surroundings. 
These experiences all involve a rather diffuse sense of one’s body, one’s surroundings or both 
being hot. The experience of feeling the hot sun on one’s back is different. Here, one not only 
perceives the heat but also - in part through bodily movements and associated changes in 
patterns of sensation - that it comes from a particular direction, that it has a source. When 
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heat is perceived as emanating from a nearby entity such as a light bulb, one can even gage 
that entity’s approximate location and size though tactual exploration of the surrounding area. 
In other cases, such as picking up a warm coffee cup, the touch of the object and the 
perception of its warmth seem to knit together seamlessly; what is perceived is not an object 
plus heat, but a hot object. Hence heat perception can have a wide range of experiential 
contents, which do not always incorporate a sense of coming into physical contact with 
something or of clear boundaries. In addition, the object of perception need not be the 
proximal stimulus; heat can be perceived as a property of something that is not in contact 
with one’s body. 
However, could we simply deny that heat perception belongs to touch? Some people 
lose the ability to detect heat while retaining other tactual abilities, and vice versa. But others 
suffer selective loss of colour vision, visual object recognition or visual perception of 
movement, and nobody would argue on that basis that such abilities are non-visual. There is, 
I think, a good phenomenological case for the unity of touch and heat perception: heat 
perception and perception of other properties are often co-constitutive of unified tactual 
experiences. I refer to ‘heat’, rather than ‘temperature’, because perceptions of hot and cold 
depend upon different kinds of sensory receptor, but the point applies equally to perception of 
cold. Helen Keller, in her account of the world she inhabited without sight and hearing, 
emphasises the richness and diversity of tactual experience, and how perception of cold 
encompasses much more than simple gradation: ‘The coolness of a water-lily rounding into 
bloom is different from the coolness of an evening wind in summer, and different again from 
the coolness of the rain that soaks into the hearts of growing things’ [1908/2003: 11]. The 
property of ‘coolness’ is integrated into the overall tactual experience, rather being an ‘add-
on’ to the texture of a lily or the pressure of the wind.  
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We need not take Keller’s word for this. It has been shown that tactual perception of 
environmental properties often depends upon combinations of sensory inputs. For instance, 
pressure plus cold can facilitate perception of wetness, whereas pressure plus warmth is often 
perceived as oiliness. Temperature also affects perception of heaviness - a cold coin placed 
on the forehead feels heavier than a warm one [Katz 1925/1989; Krueger 1982:10-11]. Much 
of what we are said to perceive through ‘touch’ thus depends upon hot and cold receptors 
working in concert with other kinds of receptor. One might object that the same applies to 
interactions between established senses. For example, how something tastes can be affected 
by how it looks, and tactual experience is influenced by what we see, as demonstrated by the 
‘rubber hand illusion’ [Botvinick and Cohen 1998]. The relationship between heat, cold and 
pressure in tactual perception is different though. In the rubber hand illusion, the relevant 
property (the location of one’s hand) is already perceived without the aid of vision. Input 
from vision changes how a type of property is perceived, rather than enabling perception of a 
property of that type. However, in the above example of wetness perception, there would be 
no perception of wetness at all if perception of cold were subtracted. Hence we can 
distinguish a form of interdependence that frequently characterises tactual perception (a) 
from a weaker form that applies to certain inter-sensory cases (b): 
 
a. Without both A and B, property C would not have been perceived at all. 
b. Without the addition of A to B, property C would have been perceived differently. 
 
Not all perceptions of wetness depend upon a combination of pressure and cold. 
Hence the claim that C would not have been perceived applies to only some instances of C-
perception. One might insist upon the stronger requirement that, for there to be sensory unity 
between A and B, all perceptions of C-type properties must depend upon the combination of 
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A and B. But this would be too strong, as perception of many property types does not rely 
exclusively upon one sense. For example, we perceive shape, size, texture and distance 
through vision and touch. So I suggest that (a) is the strongest form of interdependence we 
can require for a phenomenologically unified sense. With touch and temperature, this is what 
we have. The same level of interdependence may characterise some interactions between 
established senses, but it is ubiquitous in tactual experience. Should it turn out to be 
ubiquitous elsewhere too, this would raise problems for the more general project of 
individuating the senses [O’Callaghan forthcoming]. For current purposes though, I am 
concerned only with touch. Suffice it to say that, regardless of what applies to other senses, 
touch and temperature perception are sufficiently unified to resist separation. 
There is the objection that a case based solely on phenomenology is not sufficiently 
persuasive. One might even appeal to phenomenology in order to challenge my position. For 
example, that we are able to focus our attention solely upon an experience of heat could be 
taken to show that it is separable from touch. I do not find that claim plausible. By analogy, I 
can visually attend to my computer keyboard, but this does not imply that my visual 
experience consists only of the keyboard, or that my perception of the keyboard is extricable 
from the rest of my visual experience. Even so, it could at least be maintained that appeals to 
phenomenology are unreliable. But a phenomenological case can call upon other sources, 
such as neurobiology, for support. The latter might be taken to show that touch and heat 
perception are distinct, as they depend upon different kinds of sensory receptor [Gray 2003]. 
However, recent neurobiological work better complements a single sense view. For example, 
Lumpkin and Caterina [2007] address the complexity and intermingling of the sensory 
mechanisms involved in touch and temperature perception. They emphasise the ‘recurring 
theme’ of the ‘polymodality of putative transduction channels’ (meaning that different 
stimulus types are processed by some of the same sensory mechanisms). This, they suggest, 
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‘raises the possibility that sensory integration begins at the first step of signalling’ [2007: 
863]. And, according to Olausson et al. [2010: 186], certain kinds of pressure receptor are 
also responsive to cooling. This kind of evidence poses serious problems for any attempt to 
separate touch from temperature perception on neurobiological grounds.
7
 
Even if we set aside perception of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’, the contents of tactual experience 
are remarkably diverse. Consider Keller’s description of what she perceived through 
vibration, which includes far more than entities in physical contact with her: 
 
The thousand soft voices of the earth have truly found their way to me – the small rustle in the 
tufts of grass, the silky swish of leaves, the buzz of insects, the hum of bees in blossoms I have 
plucked, the flutter of a bird’s wings after his bath, and the slender rippling vibration of water 
running over pebbles. [….] I have endlessly varied, instructive contacts with all the world, with 
life, with the atmosphere whose radiant activity enfolds us all. The thrilling energy of the all-
encasing air is warm and rapturous. Heat-waves and sound-waves play upon my face in infinite 
variety and combination, until I am able to surmise what must be the myriad sounds that my 
senseless ears have not heard. [1908/2003: 40-41]
8
 
 
I do not claim that the ability to perceive sound waves thorough the skin literally 
amounts to a form of hearing.
9
 What I do want to emphasise though is that we perceive 
vibration through touch, and that this results in a range of different perceptual contents. When 
                                                          
7
 See also Fulkerson [forthcoming] for a defence of the view that touch is ‘unisensory’ rather than 
‘multisensory’. 
8
 Keller’s experience of touch was unusual in many ways. Nevertheless, many of the perceptual achievements 
she describes are refinements of familiar forms of perception, rather than radically novel abilities. 
9
 Neither would I want to insist that a ‘tactile visual substitution system’, which stimulates the skin, amounts to a 
form of vision.  
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we tactually perceive the vibration of loud music, the feeling of vibration can itself be the 
object of perception. We might further perceive it as emanating from some direction or 
location. However, vibration is often a means of perceiving something else, rather than the 
primary object of perception. Consider placing one’s arm on a railway track as a heavy train 
draws close. What is perceived is not simply a pattern or rhythm but ‘something coming’. 
Indeed, it is often difficult not to perceive vibrations as coming from some entity or event.
10
 
One might respond that all these cases, and the heat cases too, also involve perception 
of the proximal stimulus that makes contact with one’s body. Hence, even if perception of 
physical contact (criterion ii) is not universal, there is always perception of a stimulus that we 
are in physical contact with (criterion i).  However, there are tactual experiences where this is 
clearly not so, such as experiences of absence. Much of the upper half of my body is 
currently in contact with my shirt but what I feel most conspicuously is a part that is 
uncovered, where the shirt is not tucked in. In that area, there is a slightly uncomfortable 
feeling of coldness, of the draft that is coming in through the door. I may well experience the 
draft but I also have an experience of something being missing. A different kind of 
experienced absence is also commonplace in active touch. Merleau-Ponty [1945/1962: 316] 
offers the following example: ‘If I touch a piece of linen material or a brush, between the 
bristles of the brush and the threads of the linen, there does not lie a tactile nothingness, but a 
tactile space devoid of matter, a tactile background’. In perceiving the bristles, one also 
perceives the space between them. The sense of an absence of contact is as much part of the 
                                                          
10
 Katz [1925/1989: 203-4] maintains that touch is more a vibration sense than a pressure sense. This, he 
observes, makes the claim that touch is a contact sense less plausible. 
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experience as contact is.
11
 The fact that we can have tactual experiences of absence further 
shows that touch requires neither perception of something that we are in physical contact with 
nor experience of contact. 
Can tactual perception be characterised in terms of some other content? This seems 
unlikely. The sense of touch accommodates a diverse range of experiential contents and, once 
various intuitions about touch and physical contact are rejected, it is not at all clear that there 
is a sense-specific content common to them all. Perhaps, one might argue, sophisticated 
contents such as ‘this object is cube-shaped’ are inferred from touch rather than perceived. If 
so, there might be a case for touch having distinctive limitations. However, I suggest that 
touch can involve a broad spectrum of contents, ranging from vaguely localised bodily 
sensations to recognition of something as a specific kind of object. The issue of where and 
how to draw the line between perceptual and non-perceptual content is, of course, a 
contentious one. I am inclined towards a fairly liberal view. For example, in the visual case, I 
would maintain that we can perceive a cup as a cup, rather than perceiving some other 
content and subsequently recognising a cup.
12
 (My reasons are phenomenological – we do not 
usually have access to more basic experiences that such contents are derived from, and I do 
not think there are sufficient grounds for divorcing perceptual content from experience.) So 
                                                          
11
 This is partly because perception incorporates a sense of anticipation, which does not imply conceptual 
content. At least some perceptual anticipation is non-conceptual in nature. For example, you might feel surprise 
when a hand gently touches your shoulder, despite not having any explicit expectation about what will happen 
next. 
12
 See Bayne [2009] for a good recent defence of the liberal view. His case hinges on the example of associative 
agnosia, where people have intact form perception but cannot categorise entities. This, he says, plausibly affects 
the ‘phenomenal character’ of perception. 
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my question is this: if we allow that visual experience can incorporate such contents, does the 
same apply to touch? 
There are cases where it is unclear whether or not touch incorporates object 
recognition: when you wash a cup without seeing it, do you perceive it as a cup with your 
hands or do you infer from how it feels that it is a cup? Other cases are more straightforward 
though. Suppose you are handling a delicate artefact that you know to be worth $10,000,000. 
This knowledge will no doubt have a profound effect upon your tactual experience, but it is 
not constitutive of the experience. Appreciation that this is artefact P, a cherished object 
worth $10,000,000, is not ‘in the hands’. However, recognition of at least some kinds of 
object is integral to touch. Take the experience of rolling a tube between your hands. You do 
not have two distinct perceptions, one in each hand, but a unified perception of the tube. As 
Gibson [1962: 481] notes, what you perceive is a tubular object, rather than two separate sets 
of ‘local signs’. So touch can at least distinguish certain objects on the basis of shape. You 
not only perceive the tube. In so doing, you recognise it as a tube. 
How limited is touch’s capacity for distinguishing kinds of object? Even if we take 
something as simple as a cube, the act of recognition is often distinct from tactual perception. 
If you stumble upon a cube by accident and rely solely upon touch to identify its shape, you 
will not perceive it as a cube but infer that it is a cube after you have explored it tactually. 
However, in a more constrained scenario, I suggest that it could be perceived as a cube. 
Imagine having a dull job that, for whatever reason, involves picking spheres from a big jar 
and separating them from the occasional cube that turns up. After doing this for a while, you 
would recognise something as a cube as soon as you touched it, rather than having to feel 
around and then infer that it is a cube. So, where perception is constrained by habit, skill and 
anticipation, object recognition through tactual perception seems a lot more plausible. Indeed, 
it may be that touch can involve recognition of quite specific categories of object, rather than 
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just cubes and the like. The fact that it seldom does so is, I suggest, not a principled but a 
contingent limitation upon its discriminative ability, as exemplified by people with 
extraordinarily refined tactual perception, such as Helen Keller.  
 
4. Experiential Character 
Let us turn to Grice’s much-debated second criterion and consider whether all instances of 
touch are unified by a common experiential character, despite diversity of content. I will take 
Martin’s account of touch and bodily experience as my starting point for this. Martin 
maintains, on phenomenological grounds, that body sense is partly constitutive of touch. He 
claims that touch does not involve a bodily feeling plus the perception of some object outside 
of the body but only the ‘one state of mind, which can be attended to in different ways’ 
[1992: 204]. What we perceive is a boundary, and the most prominent aspect of the 
experience might be what falls ‘outside’ or ‘inside’ of it. However, because a boundary is 
always perceived as having an inside and an outside, the recessive aspect of the experience is 
never wholly absent.  
I suggest that matters are more complicated than Martin acknowledges. Touch is 
indeed a unitary experience, rather than a combination of ‘bodily’ and ‘external’ components, 
as I will further emphasise in Section 5. Martin is also right to note that one or the other 
aspect can be most prominent. But he misconstrues bodily experience by assuming that it is 
exhausted by the perceived body: ‘awareness of one’s body as one’s body involves a sense of 
its being a bounded object within a larger space, and that just is to locate it within a space of 
tactual objects’ [1993: 213]. When it comes to effortless interaction with a tool, for instance, 
we do not simply perceive our bodies as recessive objects of perception. The body features in 
experience as that which perceives, more so than as something perceived [Ratcliffe 2008]. 
Perceiving a pen, while comfortably and effortlessly using it as a tool, involves a sense of 
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one’s hand as inconspicuous, far from the forefront of experience. Once the hand becomes 
conspicuous, when it sweats, aches and the pen slides, the pen is perceived differently too. 
The hand that feels clammy, conspicuous and awkward is no longer a medium through which 
the pen could be perceived as something to be effortlessly used. Hence a change in the 
manner and extent to which a part of the body appears as an object of perception is at the 
same time a change in how one perceives something else. 
It is often maintained that experience is ‘transparent’, meaning that its qualities are 
exhausted by what is experienced. Hence Grice [1966] worries that the ‘special introspectible 
character’ of a sense might collapse back into an account of what we are aware of through it. 
However, this does not apply to touch. Its ‘special introspectible character’ is bodily 
experience and the phenomenology of the body is not exhausted by its being an object of 
perception. The changeable way in which the body appears is, at the same time, a changeable 
way of perceiving other entities. So we experience our perceiving, rather than just what we 
perceive. Even when the perceiving body or part of it is not a conspicuous object of tactual 
perception, it can still have a phenomenology, as exemplified by the contrast between a hand 
that is effortlessly immersed in activity and the same hand when anaesthetised. In the latter 
case, you no longer feel the hand, whereas in the former you do. Even though it is not a 
salient object of perception, you can still tell where your fingers are, whether they are 
touching each other, and whether and how they are moving.  
The phenomenology of the perceiving body is as diverse as other aspects of tactual 
experience. Sometimes the body is conspicuous, sometimes it is recessive, and there is a 
continuum between the two poles. Where it is at its most recessive, it is arguably no more 
conspicuous than in visual perception [Scott 2001]. In addition, although the boundary 
between one’s body and a perceived object is sometimes clear, it is often not. I have already 
mentioned tactual perception of heat, where there can be an absence of clear boundaries, but 
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the point applies more generally. Passive touch frequently involves a lack of 
phenomenological differentiation. As I lean my elbow on the table and think about what to 
write next, the experience does not incorporate a clear elbow/table contrast. The same goes 
for the clothes on my body and my bottom on the seat. It is only when I feel discomfort that 
the boundaries become salient. I have also mentioned examples of active touch where the 
boundaries are unclear, such as using a stick to navigate and writing with a pen, and there are 
plenty of others. The situation is more complicated than there being no boundary in 
comfortable passive touch and effortless active touch, and a boundary when there is 
discomfort. It is not just a matter of degrees; boundaries and their absence are also 
experienced in various different ways. The hand that tentatively explores a visually obscured 
and potentially threatening environment feels vulnerable, the body that lies on the sofa feels 
comfortable and secure, and the hand that ineffectively tinkers with the components of a 
broken watch feels awkward. Granted, tactual experience is causally influenced by various 
non-tactual perceptions, emotions and thoughts, but it is also plausible to maintain that it 
incorporates a range of affective qualities. In fact, there is considerable empirical support for 
the view that some forms of touch are intrinsically affective [McGlone et al. 2007; Löken et 
al. 2009; Olausson et al. 2010]. 
Interpersonal boundaries are also variable in degree and quality. When you first hold 
another person’s hand, it might seem clearly separate from you, ‘other than you’. After a 
while, there can be a sense of commonality and lack of differentiation. And take the 
experience of receiving a welcome caress. Here, one’s body feels conspicuous, as might 
one’s boundaries, but it does not feel alienated from the other person’s touch like the body 
that is subjected to an uncomfortable, unpleasant or unwelcome touch. In contrast to the view 
that touch is a boundary sense, it is interesting to note the profound feeling of separation from 
others that can be associated with deprivation of interpersonal touch. Consider the testimony 
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of Nick Yarris, a man who spent twenty-two years on America’s Death Row for a crime he 
did not commit. After it was declared that ‘no human hand would touch him’, he had no 
bodily contact with anyone for fourteen years, and was led out into the yard on a leash to 
maintain distance. This contributed to his feeling like a ‘bleak empty vessel’, and he resorted 
to making his arm numb and placing it on his face, ‘just to feel a strange human hand on my 
face…..to feel alive’.13 Touch is not only a matter of perceiving boundaries and differences; it 
also contributes to feelings of commonality and relatedness between people, without which 
we can feel isolated and diminished. Of course, these are not simply feelings of spatial, 
physical proximity, and this further illustrates that the phenomenology of touch, the sense of 
connection that it incorporates, does not simply track physical contact. 
 
5. The Organ of Touch 
Given the extraordinary diversity of tactual experience, it is not at all clear how touch might 
be phenomenologically individuated. Perhaps, however, we will have more success with non-
phenomenological criteria. Let us consider Grice’s fourth criterion: that touch is facilitated by 
a distinctive and circumscribed sense organ – the skin. This surely sounds plausible. 
However, we should reject the additional requirement that there be a distinctive way of 
connecting to the brain. Take the case of “affective touch” mentioned earlier. C-tactile 
afferents are found only in hairy skin and project to insular cortex, a brain area implicated in 
positive emotion, whereas various other nerve fibers involved in touch project to 
somatosensory cortex [Löken et al. 2009].
14
 If touch involves at least two distinct ways of 
connecting to the brain, why exclude others? Let us therefore restrict ourselves to the claim 
                                                          
13
 From an interview broadcast on the UK’s BBC Radio 4 on 12th January 2008. 
14
 This point applies to other sensory modalities too. For example, there are ‘dorsal’ and ‘ventral’ visual 
pathways [Goodale and Milner 1992]. 
20 
 
that the skin is the organ of touch. Of course, it is not simply ‘skin’ that facilitates touch. 
Hence we need to distinguish a crude sense organ view that appeals to superficial anatomy 
from a sophisticated account of how the outputs of sensory receptors located in the skin 
interact to facilitate tactual perception. 
I will reject the sense organ view, on the basis that touch is equally reliant upon 
sensory receptors elsewhere in the body. Suppose it were discovered that all we could 
perceive by means of receptors in the skin were diffuse tingling sensations. Would we then 
maintain that, contrary to popular belief, touch is just a diffuse tingling sensation? 
Alternatively, would we acknowledge that the organ of touch consists of more than just the 
skin? I suggest the latter. Hence the organ criterion should take the form ‘x is the organ of y’, 
rather than ‘y is whatever x turns out to enable’. In other words, the view that the skin is the 
organ of touch presupposes at least some appreciation of what touch is. Perceptual 
achievements that are uncontroversial instances of touch must therefore depend upon the skin 
in the right kind of way, and I will argue that they do not. 
Two different conceptions of touch are employed in psychology and elsewhere. There 
is ‘tactile perception’, the sole input for which comes from sensory receptors in the skin. This 
works in concert with proprioception (a sense of bodily position) and kinaesthesis (a sense of 
bodily movement). The term ‘haptic perception’ refers to a more inclusive conception of 
touch that incorporates all three [e.g. Klatsky and Lederman 2002: 508]. I will argue that 
tactile perception without proprioception and kinaesthesis (I refer to a combination of the 
latter two as ‘body sense’) would be so impoverished as to bear very little resemblance to the 
phenomenology and discriminative capacity we associate with the sense of touch. Hence 
tactual perception is ‘haptic’ rather than ‘tactile’. 
J. J. Gibson [1968] famously makes a case along such lines for all the senses. He 
observes that we can continue to perceive the same environmental property, despite 
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significant changes in patterns of sensory stimulation. From that, he argues that a perceptual 
system is comprised of considerably more than an anatomically distinguishable bundle of 
peripheral receptors. Whatever might be said for the other senses, this certainly applies to 
touch. Cutaneous sensation, proprioception and kinaesthesis do not interact in a way that 
allows us to distinguish three discrete perceptual outputs that later combine, and to identify 
touch with only one of these outputs. Receptors in the skin, muscles, tendons and joints work 
together in relations of mutual dependence, rather than additively [Loomis and Lederman 
1986: 2]. Take the example of self-tickling. The sensory effects are considerably less 
pronounced than when someone else tickles you, regardless of whether you know what they 
are about to do. Non-conscious anticipation of the effects of self-initiated bodily movement 
causes ‘perceptual attenuation’ [Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith 2000]. So sensory input from 
the skin is not only combined with other inputs; it can also be altered by them. As this 
example illustrates, body sense can be thought of in terms of non-conscious processes. In 
fact, Gibson’s account of perceptual systems is explicitly non-phenomenological. He 
maintains that perception is not about ‘having sensations’ but ‘detecting information’, and 
proceeds to set aside perceptual experience altogether [Gibson 1968: 2].  
However, there is also a good case for the complementary but distinct view that 
bodily experience plays a constitutive role in tactual perception. Take any list of properties 
that are generally agreed to be tactually perceivable, such as wetness, stickiness, hardness, 
roughness, smoothness and sliminess. Perception of these and many other kinds of property 
depends upon a combination of body sense (construed phenomenologically as an awareness 
of bodily position and movement) and tactile sense. Texture perception is an essentially 
dynamic process, which usually incorporates bodily movement, along with a sense of how 
one’s body is moving and of how that movement is aided or impeded by a surface. 
Nevertheless, passive touch, without bodily movement, can also facilitate sophisticated 
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perceptual discriminations. When a spider crawls up your arm, you perceive the separate 
points of contact as interrelated in systematic ways, as ‘an entity moving up my arm’ rather 
than a series of separate sensations. Passive touch is never a matter of what one might call 
‘mere sensation’. Even in passive point contact with an object, there is a sense of 
approximately where the contact occurred - the experience is of a certain part of one’s body 
being affected. In addition, one usually has at least some sense of the nature of the stimulus, 
such as whether one has been hit by a hard object or brushed by something light and soft. 
And, contrary to what some have indicated [e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962: 315], texture 
perception does not invariably require active bodily exploration; we can perceive texture 
when something moves across our stationary bodies.  
Although passive touch incorporates bodily awareness, its discriminative capacity 
might seem to count against the view that experience of bodily movement contributes to 
touch: if we can tactually perceive a wide range of properties without moving, then a sense of 
movement is not constitutive of our ability to do. But that would be wrong. The ability to 
distinguish properties through passive touch is reliant upon the recognition that we are not 
moving. And an ability to perceive whether and how we are moving is as essential to the 
sense that we are not moving as it is to the sense that we are. Without it, one could not 
distinguish the sensation of an object moving along one’s arm from that of the arm actively 
moving along an object. Hence kinaesthetic experience is implicated in passive touch too. 
Only a being capable of actively touching could also have an experience of passive touch.
15
  
                                                          
15 Our awareness of bodily movement strikes me as particularly problematic for Scott [2001], who denies that 
bodily experience is integral to touch. It would be odd – to say the least – to perceive a texture without any 
awareness of what one’s body is doing, and it is doubtful that the result would be intact texture perception minus 
kinaesthetic awareness. 
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If perception of property p relies upon a combination of sensory inputs A, B and C, it would 
be wrong to claim that the sense which enables perception of p includes only A. This, I 
suggest, applies to the roles of cutaneous sense, proprioception and kinaesthesis in tactual 
perception. The case can be made phenomenologically and non-phenomenologically. If 
cutaneous sensation were extricated from bodily experience, what remained would bear little 
resemblance to any of the experiences we associate with touch. It would not even have a felt 
bodily location. In non-phenomenological terms, touch without body sense would have few if 
any of the discriminative capacities associated with tactual perception. Hence the skin alone 
is not the organ of touch; the whole skeletal-muscular system is involved. There is no neatly 
circumscribed ‘organ’ of touch, other than the dynamic human body.  
We can still maintain that touch is distinctive insofar as it is partly accomplished by 
certain kinds of specialised receptor in the skin. But why exclude taste receptors in the 
tongue, rods and codes in the retina, or cells in the inner ear that detect vibration? The 
answer, presumably, is that they contribute to taste, vision and hearing, rather than touch. Of 
course, they differ in various ways from receptors in the skin. However, if we allow that 
touch involves several different kinds of receptor in the skin, as well as sensory receptors as 
diverse as those in the joints, tendons and muscles, then why not rods, cones and other kinds 
of receptor too? Without a well-defined touch organ, a distinction between the kinds of 
receptor involved in touch and other kinds falls back on a prior understanding of those senses 
as distinct.  
It might be objected that, in Section 3, I resisted a multisensory view of touch on the 
basis that it involves a high degree of phenomenological and neurobiological integration. But 
this need not be so high as to imply an isolable ‘organ’ of touch. And suppose the level of 
integration were markedly greater than that between any of the senses, to a degree that 
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enabled us to identify a functionally cohesive system. Even this would not suffice to 
individuate touch. That a sensory system is distinct – to some extent at least - from an 
organism’s other sensory systems does not make it a particular type of sensory system. An 
organism could have two visual systems that were largely or wholly separate from each other 
but it would not, in virtue of this, have two kinds of sense. Hence, although such a scenario 
would provide us with grounds for maintaining that touch is a sense, it would not tell us what 
makes it a distinctive kind of sense. To do that, we would need to fall back on criteria that 
have eluded us. For example, we could try to strengthen the organ criterion by also appealing 
to what is detected: maybe certain combinations of receptor together comprise a perceptual 
system in virtue of their receptivity to a particular class of environmental ‘invariants’, as 
suggested by Gibson [1968]. However, as already pointed out, we detect a heterogeneous 
range of properties through touch. And Gibson himself appears pessimistic about such an 
approach, maintaining that perceptual systems ‘overlap’, they are not ‘mutually exclusive’ 
and the same information can be picked up by different perceptual systems [1968: 3].
16
 
 
6. Stimulus, Function and Dedication 
Another option is to argue that touch is receptive to certain stimulus types. Even though it 
facilitates perception or detection of a wide range of properties, it might utilise the same kind 
of stimulus to do so or, to adopt Keeley’s [2002] formulation, the same form of energy. 
However, it should be apparent from what I have already said that this will not work either. 
Touch is receptive to different kinds of energy, such as physical pressure and heat. 
Furthermore, ‘heat’ itself is not a unitary stimulus type; radiant energy emanating from a 
                                                          
16
 See also Keeley [2002: 18] for the point that Gibsonian invariants will not serve to individuate the senses 
because different senses can detect the same invariants. 
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source is different from the mean kinetic energy of a medium. Gray [2005] modifies Keeley’s 
account by appealing to common environmental sources: a sense might utilise different forms 
of energy in order to reliably detect a single source type that they both originate from. Again 
though, the problem is that touch is receptive to such a wide range of different environmental 
properties or ‘sources’. In addition, touch is surely dedicated to detecting a wide range of 
properties, utilising different combinations of energies in order to do so. It is dedicated to 
detecting heat, amongst other things. It may also be sensitive – to some degree at least – to 
differences between radiant and kinetic energies, insofar as the kinds of exploratory 
movement involved in detecting various properties of heat sources exploit characteristics 
specific to radiant energy.  
We do not have dedicated sensory receptors for all of the property-types that touch is 
receptive to, but this does not imply a lack of dedication. Touch reliably utilises a wide range 
of different ‘exploratory strategies’, which rely upon various parts of the body and 
combinations of movements, in order to detect different properties [Klatsky and Lederman 
2002: 510]. As well as facilitating perceptual exploration and manipulation of the 
environment, it has important sexual and social functions [Montagu 1986]. It is thus 
dedicated to far more than we might infer from studying sensory receptors alone. Although 
certain parts of the body, in conjunction with certain behavioural strategies, might be 
dedicated to fairly specific perceptual tasks, the sense of touch as a whole is not specifically 
dedicated and instead encompasses a remarkably diverse range of perceptual achievements. 
Hence Keeley’s ‘energy’ and ‘dedication’ criteria do not apply to touch. As his behaviour 
criterion (that an organism can discriminate stimuli solely via the relevant form of energy) 
rests on the assumption that there is a unique form of energy involved, this is inapplicable 
too. And, as already argued, appeals to an organ of touch presuppose an understanding of 
what touch is and do not succeed in distinguishing it from other kinds of sense.  
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7. Conclusions 
I have argued that none of the Gricean criteria, however refined, succeed in characterising 
touch. It involves a diverse range of experiences, and its ‘experiential quality’ also varies 
enormously: an experience that has part of one’s body as its most conspicuous object is very 
different from one where the body operates as an inconspicuous medium of perception or 
maybe even disappears altogether from experience. Touch is also receptive to various 
different stimulus types and there is no discrete organ of touch. I do not exclude the 
possibility that attempts to individuate the other human senses will encounter similar 
problems. Even so, touch is surely distinctive in its degree of heterogeneity, and thus 
particularly difficult to accommodate.  
Various authors, from Aristotle onwards, have indicated that touch is not a specialised 
sense that some animals have and others do not.
17
 It is inextricable from the having of a 
mobile animal body, from being behaviourally receptive in any structured way to one’s 
surroundings [e.g. O’Shaughnessy 1989: 38; Husserl 1952/1989:158]. I think this is right, but 
not for the reason O’Shaughnessy claims – that an ability to navigate the world unavoidably 
involves the ability to recognise when one is and is not in physical contact with things. 
Rather, it is difficult to see how any creature could be responsive to its environment without 
utilising at least some of the perceptual achievements that fall under ‘touch’. Touch does not 
have some singular essence that is inextricable from the having of a body; it includes so much 
that it is seemingly unavoidable.  
However, Grice’s list of potential criteria is not exhaustive, regardless of how many 
refinements we might consider. It is therefore difficult to conclusively rule out the possibility 
                                                          
17
 See Freeland [1995] for a good discussion of Aristotle on touch. 
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of some set of criteria succeeding. Even so, the reasons why Gricean criteria fail also make it 
highly unlikely that other criteria will succeed: touch is just too heterogeneous and spans a 
remarkably wide range of perceptual achievements. To further illustrate the problem, 
consider Carruthers’ [2000: 122] proposal that touch and vision are phenomenologically 
distinguishable because their perceptual contents incorporate space and time in different 
ways. For example, you can visually perceive the shape of a large object almost 
instantaneously, whereas tactual perception of its shape requires diachronic exploration. I 
doubt that this holds, for reasons pointed out by Scott [2007], who argues that 
phenomenologically distinguishable visual and tactual experiences of the same entity could 
have much the same spatiotemporal structure. But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose 
that Carruthers succeeds in identifying an aspect of visual experience that distinguishes it 
from all forms of tactual experience. What would this tell us about touch? 
Human vision may well be distinguishable from touch in several ways. For instance, 
it utilises light as a medium, allows us to perceive colour and involves a field that is arguably 
quite unlike any ‘tactual field’. But stating what touch is not does not suffice to tell us what it 
is. The contrast between another sense and all the achievements we classify as touch does not 
in itself point to a positive characteristic that those achievements share. For example, touch 
encompasses so many different spatiotemporal profiles that it is not clear why all of them 
should be grouped together and distinguished from one further profile. We could maintain 
that seeing something is more different from perceiving point contact, texture, heat, heat 
sources, shape, weight, interpersonal connection, vibration and sources of vibration than any 
of them are from each other. However, it is not clear how the degree of phenomenological 
similarity or difference between experiences is to be measured. Even if we concede that 
visual experience is somehow ‘more different’, this does not resolve the matter. If a form of 
perception incorporates A, B and C, all of which are quite different, what exactly are the 
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grounds for excluding D, even if it is a bit more different? What is needed is a non-arbitrary 
commonality that unites A, B and C and at the same time excludes D. It seems unlikely that 
there are any.  
A specific form of touch might well be distinguishable from all non-tactual perception 
via some of the criteria that I have rejected. For example, it is notable that touch, unlike the 
other senses, can at least involve the experience of physical contact with something or, more 
specifically, of force. As Hans Jonas emphasises:  
  
…touch is the sense, and the only sense, in which the perception of quality is normally blended 
with the experience of force, which being reciprocal does not let the subject be passive; thus it 
is the sense in which the original encounter with reality as reality takes place. [1954: 516] 
 
However, force or pressure is not a salient characteristic of many other tactual experiences, 
such as feeling a large animal breathing hot air down your back, feeling vibrations in the 
ground emanating from an approaching object or feeling that a place is cold. It is also 
debatable whether touch is the only sense that involves force perception. For instance, the 
experience of a loud noise is not easily decoupled from a feeling of pressure in the ears. Even 
if we concede that force perception or some other quality is exclusive to a subset of tactual 
experiences, this will not serve to distinguish touch from other senses. If ‘touch’ includes 
experiences A, B and C, which we want to distinguish from experiences D, E and F that 
characterise other senses, it will not do to emphasise only A, as tactual experiences B and C 
will be excluded along with D, E and F. 
None of this is to suggest that we have any trouble talking about a sense of touch. 
However, our doing so does not imply anything more substantive than convention. By 
analogy, if all members of a community are in the habit of referring to an arbitrarily 
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delineated area on the north side of city M beyond the N bridge with a specific name, 
reference can proceed effortlessly.
18
 It is arguable that the ‘sense of touch’ is indeed a matter 
of convention, although in drawing attention to this possibility, I do not wish to rule out 
others.
19
 A conventionalist account of the senses is hinted at by Roxbee Cox [1970: 545] but 
developed more fully by Nudds [2003]. Both emphasise the use of discriminating between 
the senses, and claim that reference to a particular sense serves to inform us of what another 
person is likely to have perceived. ‘B touched y’ and ‘B saw y’ are both more informative 
than ‘B perceived y’. For instance, use of ‘saw’ or ‘touched’ tells us whether or not B is likely 
to have perceived the colour of y. Roxbee Cox adds that talk of different senses also helps us 
to appreciate what we would need to do in order to perceive what B perceived. However, a 
conventionalist account of this kind this runs into difficulties with touch. Although it is 
helpful to know whether B saw or touched y, use of ‘touch’ here does not correspond to the 
‘sense of touch’ but to ‘active touch with the hands’.20 Most references to touch and touching 
are like this. It can be very informative to know whether B actively touched y with the hands, 
but this is much more specific than knowing that B perceived y via one of the many quite 
different perceptual achievements that fall under ‘touch’. It is not ordinarily the ‘sense of 
touch’ that we contrast with other kinds of sensory achievement, but more specific 
information concerning how something was perceived. This might be explicitly supplied or, 
                                                          
18
 But things would not proceed so smoothly when it came to determining whether or not a newly discovered 
sense was an instance of touch; there would be no principled way of deciding. 
19
 For example, a referee suggested that we might be able identify certain central or paradigm cases of touch, 
perhaps with the aid of evolutionary considerations. This would not suffice to individuate touch, but it would at 
least give us an account based on more than convention.   
20
 Katz [1925/1989: 28] emphasises the hand, rather than the skin, as an organ of touch.  
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alternatively, implicitly specified by context.
21
 The same applies to scientific uses of the term, 
where what is studied is usually a more specialised achievement. Hence the utility of 
distinguishing a unitary ‘sense of touch’ is unclear. And, as the conventionalist case for 
distinguishing a sense rests upon the utility of doing so, it is unclear how it might support a 
distinction between touch and the other senses. This is not to reject such an approach 
outright, but to suggest that more work is required to make it convincing. What is needed is 
an account of the contexts in which people do appeal to the broader ‘sense of touch’ 
discussed here and its explanatory utility in those contexts. 
To conclude, how should we answer the question ‘what is the sense of touch?’ I have 
argued that it is a heterogeneous assortment of variably integrated perceptual achievements, 
and that no phenomenological or non-phenomenological characteristics serve to characterise 
them all, while excluding all other kinds of perception. When people talk about touch, they 
usually mean something more specific, which is partly why its puzzling nature usually goes 
unnoticed.
22
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